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Logic is the study of the quality of arguments. An argument consists of a set of premises P1, 
…, Pn and a conclusion C. The quality of an argument depends on at least two factors: the 
truth of the premises, and the strength with which the premises confirm the conclusion. The 
truth of the premises is a contingent factor that depends on the state of the world. The strength 
with which the premises confirm the conclusion is supposed to be independent of the state of 
the world. Logic is only concerned with this second, logical factor of the quality of 
arguments. 
 
Deductive logic classifies arguments into two kinds: those where the truth of the premises 
guarantees the truth of the conclusion, and those where they do not. The former are called 
deductively valid, and the premises are said to logically imply the conclusion. The latter are 
called deductively invalid. So the deductive-logical explication of the logical factor of the 
quality of an argument is the qualitative yes-or-no concept of deductive validity. 
 
Inductive logic aims at a more lenient explication of the logical factor of the quality of an 
argument. It comprises deductive validity as a special case. The reason is that the conclusions 
we are normally interested in are too informative to be logically implied by premises we can 
know. For instance, no set of premises about the past and present logically implies a 
conclusion about the future. Inductive logic usually aims at a quantitative explication of the 
logical factor of the quality of an argument, viz. the degree to which the premises confirm the 
conclusion. 
 
Hempel (1945) made one of the earliest attempts to develop a formal logic of qualitative 
confirmation. His goal of constructing a purely syntactical definition of confirmation is shared 
by Carnap (1962), who goes beyond Hempel by aiming at a quantitative concept of degree of 
confirmation. Carnap bases his inductive logic on the theory of probability (Kolmogorov 
1956). Due to Goodman’s (1983) “new riddle of induction” there is consensus nowadays that 
a purely syntactical definition of (degree of) confirmation cannot be adequate. However, the 
use of probability theory has been a central feature of inductive logic ever since. 
 
Here is the definition. A function Pr from a field of propositions A over a set of possibilities 
W into the real numbers is a (finitely additive and unconditional) probability measure on A if 
and only if for all propositions in A, B in A: 
(1) Pr(A)  0 
(2) Pr(W) = 1 
(3) Pr(AB) = Pr(A) + Pr(B) if AB =  
The field of propositions A over the set of possibilities W is sometimes replaced by a 
language L, where tautologies and contradictions play the role of W and , respectively. The 
conditional probability measure Pr(|) (based on the unconditional probability measure Pr on 
A) is defined for all A, B in A where Pr(B) > 0 as follows: 
(4) Pr(A|B) = Pr(AB)Pr(B) 
In inductive logic conditional probability is usually put to use in the following way (Carnap 
1962, Hawthorne 2005, Skyrms 2000). The degree of absolute confirmation of a conclusion C 
by premises P1, …, Pn relative to the probability measure Pr on the field A is defined as the 
conditional probability of C given the conjunction P = P1…Pn, Pr(C|P). For more see 
Huber (2006). 
 
It is important to note that this definition renders degree of confirmation relative to a 
probability measure on a language or field of propositions that include the premises and the 
conclusion. The difference between the Carnapian approach (Carnap 1962) and more modern 
approaches (Hawthorne 2005, Skyrms 2000) now can be put as follows. Carnap sought to 
come up with one single logical probability measure, whereas modern writers consider 
(almost) any probability measure as admissible from a purely logical point of view. 
 
The notion of deductive validity is a three-place relation between a set of premises, a 
conclusion, and a language that includes the premises and the conclusion. By trying to define 
a unique logical probability measure for each language, Carnap in effect tried to define degree 
of confirmation in a similar fashion as a three-place relation between a set of premises, a 
conclusion, and a language. Modern theories of confirmation differ in this respect, because 
they construe confirmation as a four-place relation, thus making explicit the probability 
measure. Fitelson (2005) still considers this to be a logical relation. 
 Carnap (1962) also proposed a definition of qualitative confirmation, where the idea is that 
premises confirm a conclusion if the conjunction of the premises raises the probability of the 
conclusion. A conclusion C is incrementally confirmed by premises P1, …, Pn relative to the 
probability measure Pr on the field A if and only if Pr(C|P) > Pr(C). 
 
As indicated by the qualifiers absolute and incremental, we have here two different concepts 
of confirmation. The quantitative concept of absolute confirmation is explicated by the 
conditional probability of the conclusion given the premises. Absolute confirmation thus 
consists in high conditional probability, and the qualitative concept of absolute confirmation 
is to be defined as follows. C is absolutely confirmed by P1, …, Pn relative to Pr on A if and 
only if Pr(C|P) > r, for some specified r in [1/2,1). Incremental confirmation, on the other 
hand, focuses on increase in probability. Therefore the quantitative concept of incremental 
confirmation is to be defined as the degree to which the premises increase the probability of 
the conclusion, i.e. the difference between Pr(C) and Pr(C|P). 
 
As noted by Fitelson (1999), there are many non-equivalent ways to measure degree of 
incremental confirmation. Earman (1992) discusses the distance measure d = Pr(C|P) – Pr(C), 
whereas Joyce (1999) and Christensen (1999) propose s = Pr(C|P) – Pr(C|not-P). In a 
different context, Carnap & Bar-Hillel (1952) propose to measure the informativeness of the 
conclusion C by Pr(not-C), whereas Hempel & Oppenheim (1948) suggest measuring the 
extent to which C informs us about P by Pr(not-C|not-P). It turns out that the measures of 
incremental confirmation d and s are aggregates of the degree of absolute confirmation, 
Pr(C|P), and the informativeness in the sense of Pr(not-C) and Pr(not-C|not-P), respectively. 
More precisely, 
d = Pr(C|P) + Pr(not-C) – 1 = Pr(not-C)Pr(C|P) + Pr(C)Pr(not-C|P) 
s = Pr(C|P) + Pr(not-C|not-P) – 1 = Pr(not-C|not-P)Pr(C|P) + Pr(C|not-P)Pr(not-C|P) 
In other words, incremental confirmation is proportional to expected informativeness. 
Different measures of incremental confirmation differ in the way they measure 
informativeness. 
 
We have thus detected a third factor of the quality of an argument: the informativeness of the 
conclusion. This is not surprising. After all, the informativeness of the conclusion was the 
very reason why we were considering more lenient standards than deductive validity in the 
first place. Note also that the informativeness of the conclusion is as much a logical factor as 
is the degree to which the premises confirm the conclusion. For both factors are determined 
once the premises, the conlusion, and the probability measure on the field of propositions are 
specified. In fact, this opens the door to render all factors of the quality of an argument to be 
logical; for we can now also consider the probability that the premises are true. 
 
So far we have been engaged in conceptual analysis, where we appeal to intuitions as the data 
against which to test various proposals for a definition of confirmation. The assumption is, of 
course, that the concept we are explicating is important. Surely it is a good thing for a 
hypothesis to be confirmed by the available data. Surely we should strive to list premises that 
confirm the conclusion we are arguing for. Inductive logic is important, because it is a 
normative theory. Yet conceptual analysis does not provide the resources to justify a 
normative theory. Appeals to intuitions do not show why we should prefer “well confirmed” 
hypotheses to other hypotheses, and why we should provide inductively strong rather than any 
other arguments. 
 
The analogy to deductive logic again proves helpful. The rules of deductive logic are norms 
that tell us how we should argue deductively. As any other set of norms, it needs to be 
justified. Contrary to Goodman (1983), the rules of deductive logic are not justified, because 
they adequately describe our deductive practices. They do not. The rules of deductive logic 
are justified relative to the goal of arguing truth preservingly, i.e. in such a way that the truth 
of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion. The results that provide the 
justification are known as soundness and completeness. Soundness says that every argument 
we obtain from the rules of deductive logic is such that truth is preserved when we go from 
the premises to the conclusion. Completeness states the converse. Every argument that has 
this property of truth preservation can be obtained from the rules of deductive logic. So the 
rules of deductive logic are justified relative to the goal of truth preservation. The reason is 
that they further this goal insofar as all and only deductively valid arguments are truth 
preserving. 
 
What is the goal inductive logic is supposed to further – relative to which it can be justified? 
Surely it includes truth. However, as Hume (1739) argues, it is impossible to justify induction 
relative to the goal of truth if this justification of induction means providing a deductively 
valid or an inductively strong argument with knowable premises for the conclusion that 
induction will always lead to true conclusions. However, as noted by Reichenbach (1938), 
there are deductively valid arguments for other conclusions that may show that induction 
furthers the goal of truth to the extent this is possible. Similar results obtain for absolute 
confirmation, where it can be shown that the conditional probability of a conclusion given the 
premises converges to its truth value when more and more premises are learned. 
 
However, if obtaining true conclusions were the only goal induction is supposed to further, 
induction could be replaced by deduction. All that is logically implied by what we know is 
guaranteed to be true. We do not need to go beyond the premises to satisfy the goal of truth. 
The reason we nevertheless do go beyond what is logically implied by the premises is that we 
aim at more than mere truth: we aim at informative truth. It is this very feature that makes us 
strive for a more lenient explication of the logical factor of the quality of arguments in the 
first place; and without it Hume’s problem of the justification of induction would not even get 
off the ground. Thus, the important question is whether and in which sense inductive logic can 
be justified relative to the goal of informative truth. One answer is given by Huber (2005). 
There it is shown that incremental confirmation in the sense of d or s converges to the most 
informative among all true conclusions when more and more premises are learned. 
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